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The Russian General staff does not hide that hostilities have revealled the essential defect of armed power. The Most number rebuke is addressed aviations, lost in five-day war four planes -- three storm troopers Su-25 Rook and strategic bomber Tu-22. Rooks appeared more than three groups of ten of the years back. Even beside доработанного by Su-25 no радиолокатора, to say nothing of on-board COMPUTER or computer. In complex метеоусловиях (in rain, haze, low cloud) Rook simply слепнет.
Optical sight - a thing in modern condition and inexact, and unreliable: possible and on its knock, particularly in condition of mountain terrain. And knocked in former conflict. The War in South Osetii has proved;proven -- Rook necessary change. Hardly this will be a new plane with zero . However modernized MIG-29 or Su-27 -- why and no.
The Experts in one voice bewilderred: why strategic bomber Tu-22 was sent on exploring? The Same storm troopers could cope with this problem. After issue georgian our shaved off pilot a great deal was made clear: one deal, when residing in captivity russian pilot speaks that flew on exploring, quite other -- bomb. So and kept legends about flight on exploring. However clear and other -- as weapons crew Tu-22 have to was use usual авиабомбы, rather then крылатые rockets, which simply did not turn out to be in necessary amount. And fly because of this have to was on small height, therefore huge, неманевренную machine and have shaved off.
Was Not in the sky on South Osetiey and new helicopter. Same is MI-28N Night huntsman , which is declared by main combat helicopter to russian army on nearest decennial events. Though specialist known that the most suitabling for functioning(working) in mountain exactly Ka-50 or Ka-52 - due to соосному carrying screw. But units these геликоптеров is planned buy only for undertaking спецопераций. But even though with amount plane and helicopter will okay, necessary to equip their modern complex of protection from PZRK -- portable zenithal missile complex.
The Incommensurate aircraft losses speak and about weak ability VVS Russia effectively to suppress the facility of the air defence of the enemy. A modern zenithal missile complexes PVO Torahs and Beech were Beside georgian parties. Because of strong and organized PVO became the impossible a transfer on air of the reinforcements. The Malfunction in management aviation have not allowed in due measure to close the pillars with air. The Facilities радиоэлектронной fights (REB) for suppression practically were not used. But after all approximately year was back declared about creation холдинга REB, however new structure while as well as did not take place.
With высокоточным weapon beside our armies position where better -- arsenals his(its) more three-dementional, shoot him possible from different gun and howitzers moreover outside of zones of visibility to purposes, only calibre approached. The Scheme of the using высокоточных projectile, for instance Kitolov , Krasnopoli , Daredevil , Centimetre , such a that purpose it is necessary to shine lazer ray, on which and will fly the projectile. For this calculation two-man with equipment подсветки must occupy the place, whence purpose is seen. With readiness (more exactly -- unavailability) such calculation and begin all problems our высокоточного weapons. With высокоточными mine same history.
About that that подсветку realize with unmanned flying machine (BPLA) while only think. Yes and with беспилотниками problem themselves beside us. In conflict with our parties was used only one unmanned complex of the average class Bee with radius of the action 60 km and duration of the flight two hours. Moreover, in 2006 in Russia was a buried program of the creation unmanned striking plane and device before 2012. In total backlog from world leader преодолеть will very in a complicated way.
To высокоточному weapon refer also corrected aircraft bombs and крылатые rockets. However and they in the last conflict were not used. Hardly sedation can serve the revelation of the deputy главкома land troopses Vladimira Moltenskogo, which confirmed that modern, including высокоточное, weapon beside russian military in South Osetii имелось, but was not need his(its) use. Probably so instead of receiver of the global navigational satellite system of the positioning GLONASS and soldiers, and officers drew on sleeve white identification armbands, from bandage sometimes. But also this not always helped -- noted events mutual обстреливания each other russian subdivisions. Meantime beside georgian military such receivers, only american system GPS, were, as from commander of the platoon. And russian военнослужащие all way tried заиметь exactly receivers GPS, as georgian soldiers -- automaton Kalashnikova.
The Lack fcompanion(satellite) both groups GLONASS, and reconnaissance, absence overland receiver has brought about that that cosmos information enters in the centres of control only and only on usual communication link then or by radio reaches before troopses directly. The Delay forms the watch, but sometimes and day.
In the opinion of former military scout, but now chairman of one of the commissions of the Public advice at Ministry of defense of the Russia Vitaliya SHlykova, russian army wholly on shoulder participation in small local conflict, but to opposition with serious enemy she today not ready -- she comes short first of all technical оснащенности . This last thesis is confirmed absence on our tank (unlike georgian-american) тепловизоров, night sight, high-tech facilities of the exploring and adjustments of the fire. In многом therefore, as tanks themselves have grown old -- in 58-y armies share T-62 and T-72 gets to two third. Used in conflict combat machines infantries BMP-1 and combat machines десанта BMD-1 have a fine armour, they are not protected from undermining of the land mine, бронебойного of the projectile.
Bolevye points to russian army possible was transfer and further. The Output in current whole of this how trivial, so and global: army necessary urgently and mass to rearm the modern sample. The State defense order in money calculus annually grows on 25--30%, but new weapon is bought unit, at the best -- on one-two battalion or divisional kit per annum. Is it Last year bought one modernized distant bomber TU-22M, eight (not new, but modernized) of the fighters SU-27SM, 31 modernized tanks T-72 and 31 new T-90A, 90 anti-tank missile complexes, 300 units artillery орудий and one дивизион tactical complex Iskander . The Reasons, seems, on surfaces: opaque system of the bulk purchase, uncontrolled growing of the prices on completing, completely outdated equipment on enterprise of the defense complex.
From editing: On all these problem we wrote else before begin conflict, but in editings "Time of the news" literate have reduced these questions воедино and have put(deliver)ed them on background right before passed real military conflict.
We right before observed the war, which was the armored pillars winnowed by method of the massaged use without support with air. This sorely reminded entering the soviet troopses in Afghanistan in 1979-m year, when in the absence of cosmic navigation (this was not yet in nature) on unacquainted terrain detour from given route occasionly reached the group of ten a kilometer. However in Afghanistan army acted in term of the absence enemy aircraft as such, in load;embark;stevedore exists the ground-attack aircraft on the basis same Su-25 in modification "Scorpion", deprived row described above defect "Grachey", as well as there are in presence helicopters as soviet, so and american models.
That has disturbed georgian VVS to inflict the serious blow on russian pillar, moved from Rokskogo subway to Chinvali on well shot through to road? Sooner whole, actions politician, who nowhere near did not be going to seriously to wage war with Russia, why order has not followed. Probably, does not cost(stand) to calculate that enemy always will so be halfhearted.
We observed broad using to strategic aviation for decision of the tasks to assault aviation (not only TU-22M, but also Tu-160) that is an unjustified squandering of power and facilities. Explain this possible only one - an evident defect in troops of the armses and technical facilities of conduct of the war with using the usual armses. This - an прямлое effect of the decay is defended-industrial complex, already not capable to large-volume issue new sample armses, but often - and old, already released earlier serial.
So, we practically did not see during conflict of the using plane marks "WINK" - a production basis RSK "WINK" today is practically liquidated, and corporation not capable to release serial even checked sample of its technology. Practically works only OKB, concerning with service earlier put(deliver)ed technology. The Modernization plane of the mark "WINK" for decision of the modern tasks in troops, to all appearances, was not conducted. Though several years about such program back and was declared.
The Single sample new or deeply modernized machines of the mark "Dry" also do not enter in series. Today, the leaders enterprise OPK behave with state customer in the same way, as earlier - with arabic sheik and "banana" dictator - show beautiful "picture", "впаривают" unnecessary him sample of the technology or sample, on deal not answerring technical requirement. But деградация госуправления reached such amounts that leaders of the type S.IVANOVA or Serdyukova can not neither formulate the identical order, nor check the performance. Under become him and главкомы, now and then shocking public incredible idea - for instance, главком VVS, proposed остнастить fighter of the fifth generation rocket "square section". Or главком VMF, solved suddenly to create on nonentities авианосный fleet - under that that same CHernomorskiy fleet RF risks in general to disappear to 2017-mu year.
One more question, which is stingily illuminated in SMI - found already in this war defect amunition - was above written about that that did not turn out to be in sufficient amount крылатых rockets. But even production usual patron and projectile for army today obviously it is not enough for integer of the big war. In due course in the second chechen campaign shot up the storage remainder - for shooting on mountain was wholly it is enough and old projectile with expiring application time. But these remainder nearly completely расстреляли in past campaign, and on load;embark;stevedore already did not remain.
Let's shall not forget that in Russia on get fat power works only one powder plant - in Permi. Rest like production or in general already do not produce the gunpowder, or produce in much shortened amount.
Hereinafter. Russia it is enough long, within the framework of agreement on reduction of the usual armses, at plant, specially built on our territory american (the american in such events very good and generous) in mass order deleted its missile technology. American Themselves, as follows company Lockheed-Martin, сожгли for 5 years with 1988 on 1992 only 18 their own rockets on installation, placed on firing range Tea-Sprinkling cans. For comparison - in Russia was planned during 3-4-h years to delete 916 taken out of combat maintenance standby russian твердотопливных rockets sea and overland basing. Though, equiped by main part with неядерным striking element, they wholly could be used in given conflict. But the main - in lieu thereof these deleted rockets nothing in identical amount newly was not produced!
Russia in unilateral order practically came out of Agreement on restriction of the usual armses (DOVSE) - uncords the hands our probable enemy (not only USA, but also rest country NATO) for rearmament and наращивания their own usual arsenal. But capable Russia today, on its production basis, produce the sufficient amount of the armses of the usual type to compensate simply the similar growing of the armses of the probable enemy?
This rhetorical question - certainly no. We can win load;embark;stevedore, simply assigned by her(its) mass. The structure of the losses speaks About quality of conduct of the war. The Losses russian военнослужащих have formed 64 persons погибшими and 323 - wounded and контуженными (disregarding losses югоосетинских shaping). Beside georgian parties on ministry of defense - 133 погибших, 70 unaccounted-for, 1199 wounded, on MVD - 13 погибших, 209 wounded. That is to say loss наголову разгромленной georgian army on killed whole only in 2 times more losses of the winners. Similarly correlation of the losses of the aircraft technology. The Exact given бронетехники about loss no, but on messages SMI, loss again-таки comparable.
Such structure of the losses speaks itself for itself. At collision with more powerful, even simply with more multiple enemy, russian army in her(its) present condition of the victory does not одержит.
Anatoliy Ram
Optical sight - a thing in modern condition and inexact, and unreliable: possible and on its knock, particularly in condition of mountain terrain. And knocked in former conflict. The War in South Osetii has proved;proven -- Rook necessary change. Hardly this will be a new plane with zero . However modernized MIG-29 or Su-27 -- why and no.
The Experts in one voice bewilderred: why strategic bomber Tu-22 was sent on exploring? The Same storm troopers could cope with this problem. After issue georgian our shaved off pilot a great deal was made clear: one deal, when residing in captivity russian pilot speaks that flew on exploring, quite other -- bomb. So and kept legends about flight on exploring. However clear and other -- as weapons crew Tu-22 have to was use usual авиабомбы, rather then крылатые rockets, which simply did not turn out to be in necessary amount. And fly because of this have to was on small height, therefore huge, неманевренную machine and have shaved off.
Was Not in the sky on South Osetiey and new helicopter. Same is MI-28N Night huntsman , which is declared by main combat helicopter to russian army on nearest decennial events. Though specialist known that the most suitabling for functioning(working) in mountain exactly Ka-50 or Ka-52 - due to соосному carrying screw. But units these геликоптеров is planned buy only for undertaking спецопераций. But even though with amount plane and helicopter will okay, necessary to equip their modern complex of protection from PZRK -- portable zenithal missile complex.
The Incommensurate aircraft losses speak and about weak ability VVS Russia effectively to suppress the facility of the air defence of the enemy. A modern zenithal missile complexes PVO Torahs and Beech were Beside georgian parties. Because of strong and organized PVO became the impossible a transfer on air of the reinforcements. The Malfunction in management aviation have not allowed in due measure to close the pillars with air. The Facilities радиоэлектронной fights (REB) for suppression practically were not used. But after all approximately year was back declared about creation холдинга REB, however new structure while as well as did not take place.
With высокоточным weapon beside our armies position where better -- arsenals his(its) more three-dementional, shoot him possible from different gun and howitzers moreover outside of zones of visibility to purposes, only calibre approached. The Scheme of the using высокоточных projectile, for instance Kitolov , Krasnopoli , Daredevil , Centimetre , such a that purpose it is necessary to shine lazer ray, on which and will fly the projectile. For this calculation two-man with equipment подсветки must occupy the place, whence purpose is seen. With readiness (more exactly -- unavailability) such calculation and begin all problems our высокоточного weapons. With высокоточными mine same history.
About that that подсветку realize with unmanned flying machine (BPLA) while only think. Yes and with беспилотниками problem themselves beside us. In conflict with our parties was used only one unmanned complex of the average class Bee with radius of the action 60 km and duration of the flight two hours. Moreover, in 2006 in Russia was a buried program of the creation unmanned striking plane and device before 2012. In total backlog from world leader преодолеть will very in a complicated way.
To высокоточному weapon refer also corrected aircraft bombs and крылатые rockets. However and they in the last conflict were not used. Hardly sedation can serve the revelation of the deputy главкома land troopses Vladimira Moltenskogo, which confirmed that modern, including высокоточное, weapon beside russian military in South Osetii имелось, but was not need his(its) use. Probably so instead of receiver of the global navigational satellite system of the positioning GLONASS and soldiers, and officers drew on sleeve white identification armbands, from bandage sometimes. But also this not always helped -- noted events mutual обстреливания each other russian subdivisions. Meantime beside georgian military such receivers, only american system GPS, were, as from commander of the platoon. And russian военнослужащие all way tried заиметь exactly receivers GPS, as georgian soldiers -- automaton Kalashnikova.
The Lack fcompanion(satellite) both groups GLONASS, and reconnaissance, absence overland receiver has brought about that that cosmos information enters in the centres of control only and only on usual communication link then or by radio reaches before troopses directly. The Delay forms the watch, but sometimes and day.
In the opinion of former military scout, but now chairman of one of the commissions of the Public advice at Ministry of defense of the Russia Vitaliya SHlykova, russian army wholly on shoulder participation in small local conflict, but to opposition with serious enemy she today not ready -- she comes short first of all technical оснащенности . This last thesis is confirmed absence on our tank (unlike georgian-american) тепловизоров, night sight, high-tech facilities of the exploring and adjustments of the fire. In многом therefore, as tanks themselves have grown old -- in 58-y armies share T-62 and T-72 gets to two third. Used in conflict combat machines infantries BMP-1 and combat machines десанта BMD-1 have a fine armour, they are not protected from undermining of the land mine, бронебойного of the projectile.
Bolevye points to russian army possible was transfer and further. The Output in current whole of this how trivial, so and global: army necessary urgently and mass to rearm the modern sample. The State defense order in money calculus annually grows on 25--30%, but new weapon is bought unit, at the best -- on one-two battalion or divisional kit per annum. Is it Last year bought one modernized distant bomber TU-22M, eight (not new, but modernized) of the fighters SU-27SM, 31 modernized tanks T-72 and 31 new T-90A, 90 anti-tank missile complexes, 300 units artillery орудий and one дивизион tactical complex Iskander . The Reasons, seems, on surfaces: opaque system of the bulk purchase, uncontrolled growing of the prices on completing, completely outdated equipment on enterprise of the defense complex.
From editing: On all these problem we wrote else before begin conflict, but in editings "Time of the news" literate have reduced these questions воедино and have put(deliver)ed them on background right before passed real military conflict.
We right before observed the war, which was the armored pillars winnowed by method of the massaged use without support with air. This sorely reminded entering the soviet troopses in Afghanistan in 1979-m year, when in the absence of cosmic navigation (this was not yet in nature) on unacquainted terrain detour from given route occasionly reached the group of ten a kilometer. However in Afghanistan army acted in term of the absence enemy aircraft as such, in load;embark;stevedore exists the ground-attack aircraft on the basis same Su-25 in modification "Scorpion", deprived row described above defect "Grachey", as well as there are in presence helicopters as soviet, so and american models.
That has disturbed georgian VVS to inflict the serious blow on russian pillar, moved from Rokskogo subway to Chinvali on well shot through to road? Sooner whole, actions politician, who nowhere near did not be going to seriously to wage war with Russia, why order has not followed. Probably, does not cost(stand) to calculate that enemy always will so be halfhearted.
We observed broad using to strategic aviation for decision of the tasks to assault aviation (not only TU-22M, but also Tu-160) that is an unjustified squandering of power and facilities. Explain this possible only one - an evident defect in troops of the armses and technical facilities of conduct of the war with using the usual armses. This - an прямлое effect of the decay is defended-industrial complex, already not capable to large-volume issue new sample armses, but often - and old, already released earlier serial.
So, we practically did not see during conflict of the using plane marks "WINK" - a production basis RSK "WINK" today is practically liquidated, and corporation not capable to release serial even checked sample of its technology. Practically works only OKB, concerning with service earlier put(deliver)ed technology. The Modernization plane of the mark "WINK" for decision of the modern tasks in troops, to all appearances, was not conducted. Though several years about such program back and was declared.
The Single sample new or deeply modernized machines of the mark "Dry" also do not enter in series. Today, the leaders enterprise OPK behave with state customer in the same way, as earlier - with arabic sheik and "banana" dictator - show beautiful "picture", "впаривают" unnecessary him sample of the technology or sample, on deal not answerring technical requirement. But деградация госуправления reached such amounts that leaders of the type S.IVANOVA or Serdyukova can not neither formulate the identical order, nor check the performance. Under become him and главкомы, now and then shocking public incredible idea - for instance, главком VVS, proposed остнастить fighter of the fifth generation rocket "square section". Or главком VMF, solved suddenly to create on nonentities авианосный fleet - under that that same CHernomorskiy fleet RF risks in general to disappear to 2017-mu year.
One more question, which is stingily illuminated in SMI - found already in this war defect amunition - was above written about that that did not turn out to be in sufficient amount крылатых rockets. But even production usual patron and projectile for army today obviously it is not enough for integer of the big war. In due course in the second chechen campaign shot up the storage remainder - for shooting on mountain was wholly it is enough and old projectile with expiring application time. But these remainder nearly completely расстреляли in past campaign, and on load;embark;stevedore already did not remain.
Let's shall not forget that in Russia on get fat power works only one powder plant - in Permi. Rest like production or in general already do not produce the gunpowder, or produce in much shortened amount.
Hereinafter. Russia it is enough long, within the framework of agreement on reduction of the usual armses, at plant, specially built on our territory american (the american in such events very good and generous) in mass order deleted its missile technology. American Themselves, as follows company Lockheed-Martin, сожгли for 5 years with 1988 on 1992 only 18 their own rockets on installation, placed on firing range Tea-Sprinkling cans. For comparison - in Russia was planned during 3-4-h years to delete 916 taken out of combat maintenance standby russian твердотопливных rockets sea and overland basing. Though, equiped by main part with неядерным striking element, they wholly could be used in given conflict. But the main - in lieu thereof these deleted rockets nothing in identical amount newly was not produced!
Russia in unilateral order practically came out of Agreement on restriction of the usual armses (DOVSE) - uncords the hands our probable enemy (not only USA, but also rest country NATO) for rearmament and наращивания their own usual arsenal. But capable Russia today, on its production basis, produce the sufficient amount of the armses of the usual type to compensate simply the similar growing of the armses of the probable enemy?
This rhetorical question - certainly no. We can win load;embark;stevedore, simply assigned by her(its) mass. The structure of the losses speaks About quality of conduct of the war. The Losses russian военнослужащих have formed 64 persons погибшими and 323 - wounded and контуженными (disregarding losses югоосетинских shaping). Beside georgian parties on ministry of defense - 133 погибших, 70 unaccounted-for, 1199 wounded, on MVD - 13 погибших, 209 wounded. That is to say loss наголову разгромленной georgian army on killed whole only in 2 times more losses of the winners. Similarly correlation of the losses of the aircraft technology. The Exact given бронетехники about loss no, but on messages SMI, loss again-таки comparable.
Such structure of the losses speaks itself for itself. At collision with more powerful, even simply with more multiple enemy, russian army in her(its) present condition of the victory does not одержит.
Anatoliy Ram
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